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for the academic 
achievement of 
their students. 
A Primer on Charter Schools 
and the Law
By Charles J. Russo, J.D., Ed.D.
The charter school movement began in 1991, when Minnesota enacted the first law authorizing their cre-ation. To date, 41 states plus the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico per-
mit the creation of charter schools, accord-
ing to the National Charter School Resource 
Center (n.d.).
Charter schools, public schools of choice, 
are usually operated as not-for-profit insti-
tutions independently or occasionally in 
conjunction with public organizations, such 
as colleges and universities. As such, they 
have generally survived challenges to their 
constitutionality.
This column provides a primer for educa-
tion leaders on the legal basics associated 
with the operations of charter schools. It 
does not enter the often-heated debate over 
their effectiveness.
Charter School Operations
Charter schools operate under contracts, or 
charters, usually granted by local or state 
boards of education. Organizers may have 
limited rights of appeal if their applications 
to open charter schools are denied (Berkley 
Elementary School Advisory Council v. 
School Bd. of Polk County 2002).
Depending on state legislation, groups 
of parents, not-for-profit organizations, 
and for-profit but nonreligious organiza-
tions (Brookwood Presbyterian Church v. 
Ohio Department of Education 2010) may 
form charter schools as new entities or can 
convert them from existing public schools. 
Regardless, faculty and staff are public 
employees who usually cannot be assigned 
to charter schools without their consent and 
who are ordinarily covered by collective-
bargaining agreements and state laws.
As part of their power to create school 
districts, state legislatures can devise and 
fund innovative forms of public education, 
such as charter schools, and can provide 
them with facilities reasonably equivalent 
to those used by public schools. Depending 
on state law, charter schools are ordinarily 
entitled to funding that is consistent with 
amounts spent on public education on a per-
pupil basis (Baltimore City Board of School 
Commissioners v. City Neighbors Charter 
School 2007). In that regard, an appellate 
court in North Carolina decided that state 
law required education officials to fund a 
charter school using the same method that 
applied to public schools (Sugar Creek 
Charter School v. Charlotte–Mecklenburg 
Board of Education 2008a, 2008b).
For-profit charter schools are ineligible 
for federal grants from state education 
agencies that receive monies under the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
(Arizona State Board for Charter Schools 
v. United States Department of Education 
2006). In addition, if charter school officials 
accept children who are younger than those 
students who have met the enrollment ages 
set by local boards, they do so at their own 
expense without public subsidies (Slippery 
Rock Area School District v. Pennsylvania 
Cyber Charter School 2011).
In return for being exempt from many 
state laws, officials in charter schools are 
accountable for the academic achievement 
of their students. Thus, charters can be 
nonrenewed if operators fail to demonstrate 
academic achievement. Although the length 
of charter contracts varies, most range from 
three to five years (Missouri v. Williamson 
2004). When contracts expire, charter-
granting entities can renew or terminate 
agreements to operate schools.
Although they are free from many state 
regulations concerning staff and curricula, 
Charter schools are subject to general laws. 
For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme 
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Court affirmed that since a char-
ter school performed an essential 
government function, officials were 
obligated to comply with the Right-
to-Know Law and had to disclose 
information about the school’s finan-
cial status (Zager v. Chester Commu-
nity Charter School 2007). Also, the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that operators of 
a charter school in Idaho could not 
use religious documents as textbooks 
because doing so violated a provi-
sion in the state constitution against 
the use of such materials in public 
schools (Nampa Classical Academy 
v. Goesling 2011, 2012).
Applications and Revocations
Before receiving charters, organizers 
must submit detailed plans about 
how schools will function. Charter 
schools are designed to operate free 
of many state laws and rules appli-
cable to regular public schools, such 
as hiring at least some noncertified 
teachers, so as to afford parents and 
organizers greater control over the 
education of their students. Organiz-
ers and parents are free to develop 
school missions, curricula, and pro-
grams intended to enhance student 
achievement.
Not surprisingly, litigation has 
emerged over the denial of applica-
tions to operate charter schools. 
The South Carolina Supreme Court 
affirmed that when a county board 
of education failed to satisfy state 
statutory requirements in denying 
an application, the operators were 
entitled to the charter (Lee County 
School District Board of Trustees 
v. MLD Charter School Academy 
Planning Commission 2007). Also, 
officials at a for-profit charter 
school in Pennsylvania successfully 
challenged a local board’s denial 
of their application (Carbondale 
Area School District v. Fell Charter 
School 2003). An appellate court 
affirmed that insofar as the orga-
nizers complied with appropriate 
statutory requirements relating to 
the school’s operation, they were 
entitled to the charter.
If local boards have the power 
to approve or deny applications 
concerning the creation of char-
ter schools, they must act in good 
faith. In Florida, an appellate court 
affirmed that where a local board 
denied an application based on 
unsupported assumptions about 
the quality of the education that it 
might have provided and its con-
cerns about the applicants’ lack of 
capital funding or use of operational 
dollars, the state board of educa-
tion had the authority to overrule 
its action (School Board of Osceola 
County v. UCP of Central Florida 
2005a, 2005b). The court reasoned 
that in denying the application, the 
board failed to act in good faith 
because it did not provide a legally 
sufficient reason for doing so.
In the same year, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court addressed a dispute 
in which the applicants sought to 
operate a charter school in violation 
of a provision in the statute forbid-
ding schools from opening if their 
sole purpose was to avoid school 
closures or consolidations. The court 
held that because the local board’s 
initial denial was unsupported by 
evidence that the applicants intended 
to avoid obeying the statute, it had 
to act anew on the application (Lara-
mie County School District No. 2 v. 
Albin Cats Charter School 2005).
At the other end of the process, 
the Florida Supreme Court permitted 
the immediate termination of a char-
ter for fiscal mismanagement (School 
Board of Palm Beach County v. 
Survivors Charter School 2009). 
In addition, intermediate appellate 
courts in Florida, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have 
upheld the revocations of charters 
where organizers failed to satisfy 
statutory standards.
Other appellate courts agreed that 
as long as state officials do not act 
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess 
of their powers in denying renewals, 
charter school operators have limited 
rights of appeal (Kamit Institute for 
Magnificent Achievers v. District 
of Columbia Public Charter School 
Board 2012; Pinnacle Charter School 
v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State 
of New York 2013a, 2013b).
Nondiscrimination Provisions
Because charter schools are subject 
to federal and state antidiscrimina-
tion laws, they must be open with-
out cost to all children, including 
students with disabilities, and must 
pay for their programming, such 
as homebound instruction (Golden 
Door Charter School v. State-
Operated School District of City of 
Jersey City, Hudson County 2008). 
In Pennsylvania, an appellate court 
rejected a local board’s claim that 
a charter school designed for stu-
dents who were gifted impermissibly 
discriminated on intellectual ability 
(Central Dauphin School District v. 
Founding Coalition of Infinity Char-
ter School 2004a, 2004b). The court 
affirmed that charter schools may 
limit admissions by specialty areas 
and that officials demonstrated sus-
tainable parental support, the pres-
ence of an adequate financial plan, 
and appropriate physical facilities.
In New Jersey, officials at two 
charter schools who transferred stu-
dents with special needs to private 
schools without consulting their local 
boards unsuccessfully sought reim-
bursement for their expenses. The 
federal trial court granted the charter 
schools’ motion for summary judg-
ment on the basis that the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) does not grant local boards 
private rights of action to dispute 
the placements of students from 
charter schools unless the parties 
first exhaust administrative remedies 
under the act’s provisions by means 
of due process hearings (Asbury Park 
Board of Education v. Hope Acad-
emy Charter School 2003).
On a different issue involving the 
IDEA, in the first of two cases from 
the District of Columbia concern-
ing charter schools and attorney 
fees, the federal trial court granted 
a father’s motion for summary 
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judgment to recover fees (Brown v. 
Barbara Jordan P.C.S. 2008). The 
court noted that the statutory cap 
on attorney fees was inapplicable to 
charter schools since it only covered 
disputes about schools operated by 
the board of education. In the second 
dispute, the court thought that even 
though a student prevailed in a due 
process hearing, she was not entitled 
to recover attorney fees because in 
dropping out of school, her relation-
ship with the board was unchanged 
(E.M. v. Marriott Hospitality Public 
Chartered High School 2008). The 
court pointed out that awarding 
attorney fees would have been waste-
ful since the litigation failed to con-
tribute to the student’s welfare.
Depending on state law, local 
boards may have to provide trans-
portation for children to and from 
their charter schools (Mosaica Acad-
emy Charter School v. Common-
wealth Department of Education 
2002). However, the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed that because students 
at an independent public charter 
school were not similarly situated 
to those who attended other schools 
in a local district because they had 
longer school days and five weeks 
of summer classes, officials did not 
violate the equal protection rights 
of the children in the charter school 
(Racine Charter One v. Racine Uni-
fied School District 2005).
The court explained that inso-
far as the charter school operated 
independently of the board, it 
was more akin to an autonomous 
school district than to an individual 
school, thereby permitting officials 
to exclude the students from their 
statutory busing duty. Similarly, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court agreed 
that state law did not require a local 
board to provide transportation to 
underage children who attended kin-
dergarten in charter schools (Board 
of Education of the Town of Ham-
den v. State Bd. of Educ. 2006).
Conclusion
Regardless of one’s attitude toward 
charter schools, they have an effect 
on public education. As such, the 
more knowledge that school busi-
ness officials, their boards, and other 
education leaders have about the 
operations of charter schools, the 
better able they will be to help serve 
the children who remain in their 
own districts.
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